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INTRODUCTION 
In the field of commodity demand estimation, sophisticated representations of 
preferences are routinely employed. With the advent of duality and flexible functional 
forms, parameter rich models with sufficient flexibility to uniquely identify the full set of 
share, income and price cross-price elasticities are used. What is minimally required in a 
model of n-goods are (n+4)(n-1)/2 parameters to independently identify the (n-1) shares, 
(n-1) income elasticities and n(n-1)/2 price cross-price elasticities. More recently in this 
field, Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and Ryan and Wales (1999) have derived and 
estimated rank-3 demand systems with a further (n-1) parameters to capture a quadratic 
element in expenditure. As a broad characterization of this field, it has been found that 
more restrictive models of demand should be rejected in favor of greater generality. 
In contrast, economists who model household intertemporal choice commonly 
use rather crude functional forms. While data limitations, the necessity of maintaining 
regularity conditions, the stochastic environment or some other feature of the exercise has 
often confined modelers to a primal specification of preferences with tractable forms such 
as Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticities of Substitution and Linear Expenditure Systems, 
it can still be argued that these are early generations of models that have been rejected as 
being overly restrictive. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the feasibility of modeling intertemporal 
choice in a quite general, utility consistent manner- much along the lines of demand 
modelers- and then test the necessity of doing so. While studies focusing jointly on   4
consumption and labor supply quickly run into problems from the lack of data on the 
evolution of household consumption, what appears to be overlooked has been the 
availability of panel data on labor and wealth. We derive consumption expenditure quite 
differently using the intertemporal budget constraint. We calculate consumption 
expenditure by adding beginning wealth and earned and unearned income and subtracting 
end wealth with adjustments for rates of return on household wealth portfolios.
1 Treating 
dynamic optimization as a three good problem- how much to spend, how much to earn 
and how much to save- our specification is quite general and treats each of these choice 
variables in a symmetric and mutually consistent manner. 
Our approach draws on what are known as Frisch demand systems or lamda (? ) 
constant estimation (MaCurdy, 1981 and Altonji, 1986) which can be derived from a 
consumer profit function (Browning, Deaton and Irish, 1985). Unlike the existing 
literature which has been confined to simple specifications to either difference away or 
treat as a fixed effect the unobserved price of marginal utility,  l ” m / 1 , we invert the 
budget constraint to determine this unobservable. This innovation both required and 
enabled us to apply a new functional form that has necessary and appealing properties. 
Our functional form is globally regular, flexible, rank 3 and provides an explicit 
expression of the price of utility.  
We apply the profit function to test two commonly maintained, but restrictive, 
hypotheses; consumption-labor additivity and time separability. Avoiding the separability 
                                                 
1 Portfolio, savings and wealth are used interchangeably and are nominal quantities. We use assets to 
denote real wealth.   5
inflexibility (Blackorby, Primont and Russel, 1977) that hampers analyses based on 
flexible indirect utility or expenditure functions, the profit function can test these 
hypotheses in a straight forward manner that amounts to whether various Frisch cross-
price terms enter into the system of structural equations explaining consumption, labor 
and wealth. Although these types of separability tests seem not to have been done in the 
dynamic consumer context, Barnett and Hahm (1994) among others show its application 
in static producer contexts. Both separability restrictions are easily rejected in favor of the 
most general case. This implies that Frisch cross-prices enter into the each structural 
equation independent of its impact of ? : wages and interest rates enter into the 
consumption equation; prices and interest rates enter into the labor equation; and prices 
and wages enter into the savings equation.  
We next compare the full set of estimated elasticities of the most general model to 
those derived by the more restrictive models in order to evaluate the impact of these 
maintained assumptions. We find, for example, that the Frisch (conditional on  m) 
elasticity of consumption with respect to interest rates to be substantial in a general 
setting whereas this is constrained to zero under time separability. Because Marshallian 
(conditional on initial wealth) elasticity is related to a corresponding Frisch elasticity, 
removing the restriction affects the Marshallian elasticity of consumption with respect to 
interest rates. This generalization increases the estimated elasticity of consumption with 
respect to interest by a factor of 5 over that estimated by the restricted models. An 
unexpected result is the finding that interest rates, conditional on  m, have a significant   6
impact on labor supply which is constrained to zero in restrictive models. Because 
homogeneity of the profit function implies certain adding up properties in the matrix of 
price cross-price elasticities, removing constraints on off-diagonal Frisch elasticities 
changes the entire set of estimated price cross-price Frisch and Marshallian elasticities. 
Our procedure is able to discern how changes in wages and interest rates changes 
m depending on whether this is evaluated in cross section or in time series. We argue that 
when the response of m to wage increases is evaluated in cross section, this is best 
thought of as the effect of a transitory one year increase in wages. On the other hand, 
when this is evaluated in time series, this can best be though of as a perturbation to the 
evolutionary path of wages which has some persistence. By comparing the two, we find 
that the wage effect on  m in time series is over 6.5 times stronger than it is for a 
transitory wage increase, suggesting if perturbed wages revert to a mean geometrically, it 
does so at about 18% annually. Conditional on initial wealth, labor supply switches from 
inelastic but positively sloped in response to short term wage increases to one that is 
backward bending for long term wage increases due to a wealth effect. 
Generalizing the modeling of household choice also changes the estimates of 
several important intertemporal parameters. For example, restrictive models estimate that 
the rate of time preference is around 5% while in our more general model it is 1.5%. 
Additionally, intertemporal optimization that gives rise to the Euler equation implies that 
the elasticity of l with respect to interest rates should be approximately one. Our 
restricted models find that households are poor intertemporal optimizers with estimates of   7
this elasticity from 0.206 to 0.232 whereas our preferred general model finds an estimate 
of 1.084. It appears that interest rates have two distinct channels of operation; one 
through the structural equations conditional on  l and another through the Euler equation 
representing an intertemporal optimization- but time separable models cannot distinguish 
the two effects. 
This paper advances the modeling of household intertemporal choice in a number 
of profound ways. This is the first time that the profit function has been applied to the 
complete set of dynamic choices faced by households. We use a “hard” budget 
constraint- where initial wealth is predetermined or weakly exogenous. This contrasts 
with static analyses of consumer demand where within period total expenditure is 
assumed exogenous when in fact it is endogenous to the intertemporal problem. This 
difficulty arises in static analyses because a savings choice is not explicitly modeled 
which we have done here.  
In one sense, we have simplified the problem. We do not think of intertemporal 
optimization as a maximization of utility functions that are somehow defined over vague 
and distant future commodity bundles. Instead, we look at the immediate choice facing 
households: How much do I consume, work and save today? The profit function treats 
each choice variable in a symmetric and mutually consistent manner. Further, our profit 
function is globally regular and derived from an approximation scheme with desirable 
properties. Most critically perhaps, we show that models with separability restrictions 
which inform most of our current understanding of labor, consumption, savings and   8
intertemporal elasticities should be rejected in favor of a general model such as ours 
when modeling household intertemporal choice. 
The following section presents a theoretical discussion of our approach and the 
new functional form. This is followed by a section describing the data used for this 
analysis. This is followed by a discussion of our results and a conclusion where we 
emphasizes the many possible extensions to this basic framework that we hope 
economists find fruitful. 
 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
In this section, we present the intertemporal decision as a one year problem where 
households evaluate prices, wages and interest rates together with an initial level of 
wealth to plan their consumption, labor and savings choices. We develop the connection 
between a household’s present cost of future consumption and a contemporaneous 
interest rate and introduce a nominal price of next period consumption which we call an 
interest factor. We discuss the profit function which incorporates our interest factor as 
well as theoretical features of our model. As will be seen in the next section, the data 
available does not include information on beginning-of-year and end-of-year wealth but 
rather wealth at the beginning and end of a five-year span. The issue of matching this 
model with 5 year’s of incomplete data is addressed in the data section but it suffices here 
to state that this is considered as a sequence of 5 one-year optimizations with household 
re-optimizing with the realization of new wage and interest information each year.   9
Consider a common specification of the intertemporal budget constraint: Wt + yt 
+ wtht – ptct – (1+it)
-1Wt+1 = 0 where W is the nominal value of wealth, y is tax adjusted 
unearned income, w is after-tax nominal wage, h is hours of work, p is consumer prices, c 
is consumption, i is nominal interest and subscript t denotes time.  The choice variables 
are ct, ht and Wt+1. We have mixed real and nominal variables in this specification. Define 
the real wealth variable At = Wt/pt. The budget constraint can now be written terms of 
real choice variables: Wt + yt + wtht – ptct – rtAt+1 =  0 where rt = pt+1/(1+it) is the present 
nominal price of future real consumption and wealth. We call rt the time t interest factor 
because dividing this by pt gives a real time t cost of next period consumption. Dividing 
the LHS of the intertemporal budget constraint by pt expresses the budget constraint 
exclusively in terms of real prices and quantities. The constraint, written in this form, 
alerts us to the fact that the three real choice variables; ct, ht and At+1 are linear in prices 
pt, wages wt, and interest factor rt and that predetermined nominal wealth Wt and 
exogenous income yt has the effect of shifting the level at which the constraint binds. 
Clearly then, pt, wt and rt are the correct prices corresponding to consumption, labor 
supply and future real wealth.  
Intertemporal maximization, what is called the primal problem, is often modeled 
with a recursive value function.
2 Consider the value function 
[ ]
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where V is the value function, U is the utility function, E is the expectations operator with 
respect to future dated information and d is the time discount factor. The appearance of 
past consumption in the utility function allows for durability in the case of 
0 U ) 1 t ( c ) t ( c < - and for habits in the case of  0 U ) 1 t ( c ) t ( c > - .
3 A symmetric time dependence is 
allowed for in work hours allowing the disutility of work to change with prior work 
experience. In the case of durability or habit formation, the utility function is not time-
separable and present consumption and work will affect future utility.  
The Lagrangian for the primal problem is 
) A r c p h w y W (
) h , c : r , w , p , y A p ( V E ) h , h , c , c ( U L
1 t t t t t t t t t
t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t t t 1 t t 1 t t
+
+ + + + + - -
- - + + l
+ + d + =
    (2) 
with first order conditions over present choice variables, 
0 r V E L
0 w V E U L
0 p V E U L
A t A
h t h h
c t c c
= l - d =
= l + d + =
= l - d + =
                (3) 
where time subscripts are removed for now.  
The total differentiation of the 3 first order conditions (3) with respect to 3 prices; 
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2 Meghir and Weber (1996) for example. 
3 Throughout this paper, the subscripting of a function with an argument shall denote differentiation with 
respect to the argument. Time and indexing variables may be denoted by subscripts or by parentheses.  
4 By symmetry, 6 of the 9 equations are independent.   11
Let [A] and [B] denote respectively the first and second matrix on the LHS. In the 
most restrictive case we consider where utility, ) h ( U ) c ( U U t
h
t
c + = , is additive, the 
value function does not have prior consumption or work hours. Additionally, the cross 
derivative Uch = 0. This means that [A] is a diagonal matrix which implies [B] is also 
diagonal. The zeros in the off-diagonal elements of [B] implies that the structural 
equations for consumption, work and wealth are functions of own price only. The 
inversion of the first order conditions (3) give the consumption function,  ) p ( f c t t
A *
t l = , 
the labor supply function,  ) w ( g h t t
A *
t l = , and the wealth function,  ) r ( h W t t
*
1 t l = +
5 
where the asterisk denotes model predicted quantities.  
Relaxing additivity, the time separable utility function ) h , c ( U U t t
TS =  has first 
order conditions  t t t t
TS
c p ) h , c ( U l =  and  t t t t
TS
h w ) h , c ( U l - = . This adds a non-zero 
element Lch to matrix [A] and implies a corresponding non-zero elements in matrix [B]. 
Inversion now leads to the consumption function  ) w , p ( f c t t t t
TS *
t l l =  and the labor 
supply function  ) w , p ( g h t t t t
TS *
t l l = . Wages now appear in the consumption function 
and prices appear in the labor supply function.  
In the most general case where consumption-labor additivity and time separability 
are relaxed, the appearance of prior consumption and labor supply in the value function 
implies that none of the off-diagonal elements of [A] are zero which implies none of the 
off-diagonal elements of [B] are zero. Thus our most general case will have a system of 
                                                 
5 We have ignored the mechanism whereby wt and rt udates expectations. This is modeled later in the paper.   12
structural equations  ) r , w , p ( f c t t t t t t
G *
t l l l = ,  ) r , w , p ( g h t t t t t t
G *
t l l l =  and 
) , r , w , p ( h W t t t t t t
G *
1 t l l l = + where all prices enter into each equation. Our objective then 
is to develop a utility consistent system of equations for consumption, labor and savings 
and examine the significance of these cross-price terms. 
We use duality theory (Diewert, 1974) rather than the specification of a particular 
utility function in a primal approach to identify preferences. Duality techniques specify a 
parent function that spawns the structural equations via differentiation with respect to a 
choice variable’s price. This is a considerable convenience and circumvents the problem 
of inverting the first order conditions (3) to find a solution. The consumption, labor 
supply and wealth functions are obtained simply by taking the derivative of the profit 
function with respect to own price. Thus for example, estimated consumption, c* = -pp 
where the subscript denotes partial differentiation and estimated consumption 
expenditures pc*= -ppp.
6 Properties required of the consumer profit function are 
homogeneity and convexity, necessary conditions given a well defined maximization 
problem.
7 There are other advantages of the dual approach related to the modeling of the 
evolution of l which we discuss more fully in the data section. 
A desirable property of any dual functional form is flexibility. Consider any 
arbitrary utility function evaluated at a certain point in n-goods space. The first derivative 
of the utility function at this point lead to n gradients and the matrix of second derivatives 
                                                 
6 Note that consumption and assets are given by the negative of the partial derivative while labor hours are 
given by the positive.   13
of the utility function contained in the Hessian lead to curvatures in n(n+1)/2 directions. 
Since an affine transformation of the utility function is innocuous because it is an equally 
valid representation of preferences, what is material is the (n-1) relative gradients and the 
(n(n+1)/2 -1) relative curvatures. A functional form with sufficient parameters to 
independently estimate each of these relative gradients and curvatures of an arbitrary 
utility function is said to be flexible.
8 
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where  t t / 1 l ” m  is the inverse of the time-t Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint or the 
price of marginal utility. Recognizing data limitations that lie ahead, prior consumption 
and work and future prices are subsumed in the profit function in accordance with our 
general approach of determining current choice variables from available exogenous 
variables. The first order conditions of the profit function (5) are identical to the first 
order conditions of the Lagrangian (3) of the primal value function.  
An important feature of the dual profit function (5) is the role played by  l. The 
profit function conditions on  l and is silent on its determination. Note that the 
expectation is over the arguments of the following period’s value function; namely 
exogenous income, y, prices, p, wages, w, and interest rates, r, from time t+1 and into the 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Reference to theoretical contributions to the consumer profit function since Deaton, Browning and Irish 
(1985) can be found in Kim (1993), Chaudhuri (1995, 1996) and McLaughlin (1995).    14
future. The term  l is not involved with the expected value function for the following 
period but rather multiplies a linear combination of time t prices and time t choice 
variables. It is this multiplicative feature that gives us the convenient property whereby 
the derivative of the profit function gives us the corresponding choice variable. Clearly, 
additional structure is needed for the empirical implementation of the profit function. The 
term  l has to be supplied independently to the profit function and resulting structural 
equations for which we will use the ex-post budget constraint and assumptions about its 
evolution.  
One of the challenges of taking a new approach to the data is often developing a 
parametric specification to fully rationalize the data. In addition to the homogeneity and 
convexity of the profit function in the observable price variables, consideration needs to 
be given for the unobserved m. We develop a model that is not only globally convex in 
prices and in m, it lends itself to an explicit expression of  m on inversion of the dynamic 
budget constraint. As far as we are aware, this is a new functional form. Our profit 
function is parameterized by  
m g + b + m a m = m p / ) , P ( C ) z : , P ( B ) , , P ( A ) z : , r , w , p (          (5) 
where P = (p1, p2, p3)’ = (p, w, r)’ is a vector of prices, z=(age, age
2, age
3, number of 
dependents, sex of household head)’ is a vector of demographic characteristics
9 and a, b 
and  g are vectors of parameters to be estimated. The sub-functions  ) , , P ( A a m , 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Flexible in our paper does not mean minimally flexible, another usage, which implies the minimum 
number of parameters required for flexibility.   15
) z : , P ( B b and  ) , P ( C g  are given by 
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where di is the indicator for the sex of the household head, i=1 indicating male and i=2 
indicating female
10, and 
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It can be readily verified the profit function is homogeneous and that a ij > 0 and 
a ijj > 0 is sufficient for global convexity.  
To illustrate some of the properties of this model, consider now the structural 
equation for end wealth of a male head of household. Our wealth equation is found by 
differentiating the parent profit function with respect to r to give 
m g + b + m a m = ¶ p ¶ = - / ) , P ( C ) z : , P ( B ) , , P ( A r / A r r r
*         (9) 













- = a m
r r w r p







                                                                                                                                                 
9 The age variable is reported age of head minus 45 years in order to center the regression around prime 
aged heads. 
10 Additional terms withb parameters of the form b ijpi
0.5pj
0.5 with convexity restriction  0 ij £ b  were also 
tried in the regression. These constraints were binding in every regression performed.   16
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A total of 16 parameters determine the wealth equation of male headed 
households. By differentiating the profit function with respect to wages and prices, it is 
easily verified that 15 parameters determine the labor supply equation and 9 parameters 
determine the consumption equation.  
 Each structural equation such as (9) conditions multiplicatively on  m and  m / 1 . 
Together with the derivative of the sub-function B which gives the third function, this 
Frisch system might be called rank 3 (Lewbel, 1991) drawing obvious analogies with 
indirect utility functions where m replaces income. Additionally as m and  m / 1  enters the 
structural equations, this can be considered as a first order Laurent approximation in  m. 
As demonstrated theoretically by Barnett (1983), the Laurent series approximation has 
superior fit compared to a Taylor series approximation of the same order and 
subsequently led to the Miniflex family of demand systems. 
Our profit function has considerable generality which we highlight be drawing 
analogies to flexible functional forms. The unrestricted off-diagonal parameters  g 12, g 13 
and  g 23 identify the off-diagonal cross-price responses of matrix [B] in (4). The 
unrestricted diagonal  g 22 and g 33 parameters identify how the structural equations 
change with respect to changes in  m / 1  and parallel the parameters that identifies income   17
responses in indirect utility systems.
11 The unrestrictedb parameters identify levels with 
sufficient parameters for flexibility and additionally capture suspected demographic and 
lifecycle influences. The diagonal parameters a 22 and a 33 are analogous to the third rank 
in rank 3 systems
12 while the off-diagonal parameters a 12, a 13 and a 23 identify how the 
structural equations change with respect to cross-price terms conditional on  m for 
additional generality. 
The economic restrictions of consumption-labor additivity and time separability 
are now easily cast as simple parametric restrictions on our structural equations which we 
describe now in order of increasing generality. The first of these we call the basic 
regression, our most parsimonious case. This regression sets all cross terms a ij = 0 and 
g ij = 0 for  j i „ and is implied by consumption-leisure additivity and time separability. 
This sets all off-diagonal elements of matrix [B] in equation (4) to zero. Additionally, all 
b parameters except 6 bij0, i=1, 2 and j=1, 2, 3, are set to zero removing the impact of 
age and number of dependents from the structural equations. 
The first generalization allows demographic variation to impact the levels c, h, 
and A. One expects labor supply and wealth demand to follow lifecycle patterns and this 
is accomplished by estimating an additional 16 b parameters associated with age, age 
squared and age cubed and the number of dependent. We call this case the demographic 
regression. 
                                                 
11 We sometimes estimate g 11 while at other times hold this as a constant. When estimated, we have 
additional generality. This is discussed later. 
12 We do not estimate a 11 for reasons discussed later.   18
The second generalization allows for consumption-leisure non-additivity. This is 
accomplished by allowing parameters a 12 and g 12 to take on non-zero values. This case 
allows for the identification of the element cw (and by symmetry hp) in matrix [B] in 
equation 4 and if non-zero implies that element Lch in matrix [A] is non-zero. This case 
we call the time-separable regression. The third generalization allows for intertemporal 
non-separability. This is accomplished by allowing the remaining parameters a 13, a 23, 
g 13 and g 23 to take non-zero values. This of course fills the remaining elements of matrix 
[B] and, if non-zero, implies matrix [A] has non zero elements. We call this case the 
general regression. 
We now discuss the determination of unobserved m. A similar approach has been 
adopted by Cooper, McLaren and Wong (2001) to a static representative consumer 
problem and McLaren, Rossitter, and Powell (2000) to determine unobserved utility in an 
expenditure function in a static macroeconomic setting. If beginning and ending wealth, 
exogenous income, wages and interest rates are known, the unobserved m is then 
implicitly defined by the budget constraint  0 r w p y W r w p = p + p + p + + . Expressing this 
more fully by explicitly showing the differentiation of the each of the sub-functions to the 
profit function, we have 
0 / rC rB rA
/ wC wB wA
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            (10)   19
Multiplying (10) by  m provides a quadratic formula in  m. Similarly, multiplying 
(10) by  l provides a quadratic formula in l. To collect like terms in (10) and for 
notational convenience, let  
) ( A p * A 33 23 22 13 12 11
3
1 i ) i ( p i a - a - a - a - a - a - = =￿ =   
) z : , P ( B y W B p y W * B
3
1 i ) i ( p i b + + = + + = ￿ =   
) , P ( C 2 C p * C
3
1 i ) i ( p i g = =￿ = . 
The second equality for A* is easily verified and the second equality for B* and C* hold 
because of homogeneity of degree 1 and 2 respectively. The positive roots of quadratic 
equation (10) expressed in these alternative forms are, respectively, 
* A 2
* C * A 4 * B * B
2 - - -
= m                 (11) 
and  
* C 2
* C * A 4 * B * B
/ 1
2 - + -
= m ” l .              (12) 
Quite serendipitously, restrictions sufficient for convexity,  0 , 0 ijj ij ‡ a ‡ a , lead 
to  0 * A £  and together with the quadratic form  0 * C ‡  becomes sufficient for a globally 
positive discriminant and a real root. These expressions for m and l, which are now 
solely in terms of observable variables, are substituted into the structural equations such 
as (9). 
The sub-functions A, B and C have an economic interpretation that is noteworthy. 
Basically, the sub-function A captures asymptotically the preferences of the infinitely   20
rich which we define as those with  m approaching infinity. The sub-function C captures 
asymptotically the preferences of the infinitely poor which we define as those with  l 
approaching infinity. The sub-function B occupies a middle ground and acts as an 
intercept and pivot point around which conditional-on-m and conditional-on-l demands 
radiate.  
To illustrate the preceding, we use the basic regression with the minimum of 
parameters for a 45 year old male head with no dependents. The structural equations for 
real consumption, labor supply and assets are respectively, 
l g + b + m a - = - p p / c 11 110 11  
l g + b + m a - = w w / h 22 120 22              (13) 
l g + b + m a - = - r r / A 33 130 33  
or structural equations for consumption expenditure, labor earnings and wealth, 
l g + b + m a - = -
2
11 110 11 p p pc  
l g + b + m a - =
2
22 120 22 w w wh             (13’) 
l g + b + m a - = -
2
33 130 33 r r rA  
Now consider the numerator of equation (11),  * C * A 4 * B * B
2 - - - . As B* 
approaches positive infinity, the term -A*C* becomes inconsequential in the discriminant 
and the numerator approaches -2B*. On the other hand, as B* approaches negative 
infinity, the numerator approaches -B*-|B*| = 0. The numerator of equation (12),   21
* C * A 4 * B * B
2 - + - , acts in the opposite manner approaching 0 as B* approaches 
positive infinity and converges to -2B* as B* approaches negative infinity.  
Finally, consider the denominator of equation (11). This is equal to 
( ) 33 22 11 2 a + a + a  in the basic regression. Substituting (11) into (13’), it is now obvious 
that as B* approaches infinity, marginal increases in wealth are apportioned to 
consumption expenditure, the absence of work earnings (because of the negative sign) 
and end-of-period wealth in the ratio  ( ) 33 22 11 11/ a + a + a a ,  ( ) 33 22 11 22 / a + a + a a  and, 
( ) 33 22 11 33 / a + a + a a  respectively. A similar operation occurs with the sub-function C 
which determines how marginal increases in wealth is apportioned to the three choice 
variables as B* approaches negative infinity and is determined by the  g parameters and 
by prices. This apportionment determined by the parameters of sub-function A we shall 
call the “A-effect,” and the apportionment determined by the parameters of sub-function 
C we shall call the “C-effect.” 
In estimation, the set of b parameters act as intercept parameters identifying the 
central location of the cross-sectional distribution of consumption, labor or wealth. Since 
one expects demographic and life cycle factors to have an important influence on 
preferences, a total of 22 ijk b  parameters are added to distinguish household heads by 
gender, age and number of dependents in the system of structural equations and their 
significance evaluated empirically.
13 We shall call both the pivotal nature of intercept 
                                                 
13 Age and dependents parameters were not added to the consumption equation. The reason for this is 
discussed in the next section.   22
identification and the impact of demographics identified by parameters in sub-function B 
the “B-effect.” 
How the structural equations are non-linear in  m is an important attribute of this 
model and solved a particularly challenging problem encountered with what might be 
called linear-in- m or linear-in- l rank 2 models. Consider the case where C(P:g)=0 and 
the structural equations are linear in m. We found that the b parameters again estimated 
the location of the data but derived values of  m took positive and negative values as the 
regression pivots linearly around the central location of the distribution. Negative values 
for the price of utility violate regularity and any economic sense. Negative values were 
found in approximately half the sample irrespective of whether the sub-functions C or A 
were identically zero.  
As mentioned above, beginning and end wealth are not available for just one year 
as has been supposed here- but fortunately, this is not a major complication. We turn next 
to a description of the data and how this was made operational despite data shortcomings.  
 
DATA 
The data for this study comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
a continuing study started in 1968 with approximately 4,800 households. Since that time, 
the panel has grown as numbers of new household formed have exceeded those that have 
attrited (Hill, 1992). Five waves of the family files from surveys fielded from 1985 to 
1989 were used which each contained detailed income and work data for the previous   23
year. Additionally, these files include two wealth supplements that asked about wealth in 
the beginning and end of this span. By the time of interview, many households have had 
long standing participation with this survey.  
To build a balanced panel across 5 years, single headed households who remained 
heads from 1984 to 1989 were selected. This choice does not allow for changes in what 
the PSID calls major adults but allows other changes to the households such as the birth 
or adoption of children or children leaving home to establish one of their own.  
We removed all cases where income, wage or wealth was top-coded in any year 
by the PSID.  
Next, a measure of real return on wealth for each year is calculated. We treat 
wealth as a single amorphous good (as the literature commonly does for consumption and 
labor supply) and add all disparate returns to wealth into a single total. We derive real 
returns by adding all recorded receipts from wealth: net of tax income received from 
financial assets such as rent, dividends and interests; and the asset portion of income from 
unincorporated businesses, farming, market gardening and roomers and boarders as 
determined by the PSID and net out the impact of marginal tax rates on this income. To 
this taxable total, one fifth of the 5-year capital gains as determined by the PSID is added 
without tax on the assumption that the capital gain is unrealized and therefore not taxable. 
Finally, we add an imputed rental services on owner occupied housing. We treat the 
decision to purchase a home as an investment, rather than consumption, decision and 
therefore add its tax-free benefit to a general total to compute the return on wealth.    24
This total return on wealth was divided by an interpolated level of wealth based 
on net wealth in 1984 and in 1989. We use the variable net wealth as defined by the PSID 
which includes the main home, other real estate, farms or businesses, stocks, cash 
accounts and other items, but exclude the value of motor vehicles. 
The income return on wealth, it, is given by 
2 / ) W W (







=     (14) 
with Wt = W1984 + (t-1984)(W1989-W1984)/5 and mtt equal to time-t marginal federal 
income tax rate.  
In the money demand literature, for example Barnett, Fisher and Serletis (1992), 
expressions are sought for the return on different kinds of money assets and a 
household’s return is based on their mix of these assets. This assumption is appropriate if 
the monetary asset classes are homogeneous and there is a competitive market which 
brings about one price (or return) for each asset class.  
Here, we use the household’s income and capital gain on their assets to derive an 
individual specific return on assets rather than infer a general rate based on an average 
market rate of return on financial assets, say the fixed term bond market. Cross-sectional 
variation in wages in the labor supply literature is often explained by differential 
productivities of workers such that firms are paying a fixed wage rate per unit of 
productivity. In a parallel fashion, we consider it reasonable that households may also 
have different productivities in obtaining yields on their assets. The return on assets we 
consider- all disparate items that make up wealth- is much more heterogeneous than that   25
based narrowly on just monetary or financial assets. For instance, a proprietor of a 
business is likely to have intimate knowledge of their unique return on a particular 
investment in their business which will not be arbitraged because of the absence of 
markets. Our analysis is interested in the range of returns felt by households on the 
entirety of their wealth and their response to their idiosyncratic return rather than their 
response to a return available in any specific market. 
All households with starting or ending wealth of less that $500 were deleted. 
Some of these cases showed implausibly large values for it which is understandable given 
the denominator of (14) is small. Additionally, all households with it greater than 40% or 
less than -20% in any of the five years were also deleted.  
Next, a value for 5 year consumption is calculated for each household. This is 
calculated as the residual from the ex-post budget constraint. The budget constraint for a 
one year period is Wt + y + wtht – ptct – rtAt+1 =  0. By recursive substitution, the 5 year 
budget constraint is  
0      A r r r   -   ) c p h w y ( rr     W 1989 1988 1988
1988
1984 t t t t t t t 1984 = - + +￿ =          (15) 
where rr1984=1 and  ￿ = + =
j
1985 t 1 t t j p / r rr , j=1985,…1988. While it is not possible to 
calculate consumption in each period, we can calculate 5 year composite consumption by  
1989 1988 1988
1988
1984 t t t t t 1984
1988
1984 t t t t A r r r   -   ) h w y ( rr       W c p rr   ￿ ￿ = = + + =        (16) 
where all terms on the RHS are observable and based on ex post prices. 
Using this measure of consumption, several cases of negative consumption 
expenditures were observed. For these cases, final assets were too high given beginning   26
assets and recorded incomes. These cases were deleted as were cases which had 
calculated 5 year consumption expenditures less than $5,000 which we arbitrary define as 
a subsistence level of expenditure. 
The term yt which measures time t exogenous income was calculated as income 
from all public and private transfers plus inheritances plus federal marginal tax rates 
times pretax labor earnings less federal income taxes. Since we wish to capture household 
decisions at the margins, it is appropriate to use (1-mtt)pretax waget as the real benefit of 
working the marginal hour in year t. However, since we have a progressive income tax 
system, marginal tax rates multiplied by gross labor earnings overstates the amount of tax 
paid on labor earnings. As the objective of the consumption equation (16) is to calculate 
the present value of consumption from observables, we add back marginal tax multiplied 
by earning and subtract federal income taxes since this information is available. This has 
the effect of adding what many economist call virtual income. 
After removing observations as described, 525 observations were left. Summary 
statistics for both male and female headed households are recorded in the table 1.  
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The model counterpart to the ex-post 5-year budget constraint (15) is 
accomplished by supplying the corresponding Frisch demand for each quantity. 
Naturally, we will supply the prices that prevailed at the time the choice was made. In 
each period, household exercised 3 choices: a consumption, work and savings decision,   27
maximizing their value function (1). We wish to impose the minimum structure necessary 
to estimate parameters of the model. So, although households made 5 endogenous At 
choices for t= 1985,…,1989, since only the final year is available in the data, we do not 
impose any structure on the earlier unknown wealth choices. Similarly, the household 
made 5 endogenous ct choices for t= 1985,…,1989 which cannot be determined 
individually. We impose no structure on the 5 year ex-post budget (15), other than the 
appropriate time t Frisch demand represented the choices made. Thus, the model 
counterpart to (15) is 
0      (1988) r r r     )) t ( p ) t ( w y ( rr     W r 1988 1988
1988
1984 t p t w t t t 1984 = p + p + p + +￿ =      (17) 
It can be seen from profit function (5), which in turn is derived from value 
function (1), that Frisch demands represent a household’s best effort at intertemporal 
optimization given time t information. It is certainly possible for a household to regret a 
decision made previously given the realization of new information. It is also true that a 
household will evaluate future prices as it affects the expected next period value function 
in making there present choices but that this choice is made in light of present 
information only.  
The model counterpart of the budget constraint (17) reveals another advantage of 
the dual approach we have used. In the dynamic context, consumption and work are 
control variables while asset is a state variable. Ending asset is an endogenous variable if 
we are to model this choice; however it becomes a predetermined, weakly exogenous 
variable in the following period. When a primal approach is used for the specification of   28
preferences, one must employ recursive substitution schemes but this becomes intractable 
when there is any generality to the utility function. The dual approach we employ adds an 
additional state variable, l, which we can model independently. 
Our approach gives rise to 7 structural equations that can be matched with the 
data: one for 1989 wealth, one for 5 year composite consumption and 5 for labor supply 
in each of the years 1984 to1988. However, consumption was not independently 
determined but rather imputed from (16), a function of 1989 wealth and 5 year’s labor 
supply. Similarly, the model counterpart to 5 year composite consumption is required to 
implicitly define m. Thus, we use the 6 independent estimating equations;
14 
t w t t t ) t ( w h w e + p =       for t=1984,…1988, and 
1989 r 1989 1989 1989 ) 1988 ( r W r e + p - =               (18) 
appending  t e  as period t error. We assume that  )' , , , , , ( 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 e e e e e e = e  is 
multivariate normal and we estimated parameters using the full information maximum 
likelihood procedure implemented in TSP version 4.5. 
We multiply the wealth equation by r1988 and each period t labor supply equation 
by wt, a practice common in the demand analysis field that allows for adding up in the 
budget constraint. For our purpose, it also has the effect of removing households with 
non-working heads from the regression.
15 Thus we use all the 525 observations available 
to estimate our parameters while only those working in any year contribute to the 
                                                 
14 A consumption expenditure estimating equation could be added to the list but the error from this equation 
is not independent of the other 6 errors as the sum of all 7 errors is identically zero.   29
estimation of parameters associated with wages and labor supply in the year they worked. 
While this is only a subset of the sample (see table 1), we have 5 years of repeated 
measures recording their work choices. 
As the 6 estimating equations (18) stand, they contain 5 unobserved arguments, 
t m  while the budget constraint (17) allows us to solve only one additional variable. Our 
strategy is to use the budget constraint to determine an individual specific  i m  and offer 
readers a menu of 3 choices which relate  it m  to  i m  where we introduce the i indexing 
subscript to denote household i. These choices will be guided by what readers feel are 
reasonable behavioral assumptions about the ability of households to intertemporally 
optimize. We are not partisan to any specific formulation on the evolution of  m and 
consider it simply an empirical matter.  
Each of these alternatives will have the form  i i i i i it ) t , : W , y , r , w , p ( f m d = m  
where p, w, r, y, and W denote a 5 year vector containing the corresponding price, wage, 
interest factor, exogenous income or wealth series, ddenotes a time discount factor and 
the subscript denotes household i, and can be substituted into equation (17). Function f is 
required to be homogeneous of degree zero in prices, exogenous income and nominal 
wealth. Further, function f in its most general form exhausts all price and wealth 
information available in our analysis. The implicit definition of  m in equation (17) makes 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Our purpose is not to explain the dichotomous decision to work or not for which a reservation wage 
needs to be constructed.    30
this, like function f, a function of nearly all available information in the general 
regression. We show, however, that these can be made to play different roles. 
The first of our models supplying the 5 required functions we call the fixed 
effects model and corresponds to  i 1988 t t , i ) p / p ( m = m . The fixed effects model holds the 
real price of utility constant for each household i for the 5 time periods t. Consequently, 
the is no time-series variation of  t , i m  within a household. Cross-sectional differences in 
beginning wealth, exogenous income, wages and interest rates are the sole factor creating 
cross-sectional differences in the real price of utility in this specification. The second case 
we offer we call the perfect foresight model and is defined by  i 1988 , i m = m  and 
i
1987
t j j j , i 1988 t t , i p / r p / p m d = m ￿ = . This specification assumes the perfect foresight Euler 
equation is operational where time discount parameter,d, is an additional parameter 
requiring estimation. In this specification, cross-sectional variation drive differences in 
the price of marginal utility for the year 1988,
16 however, household specific time t price 
of marginal utility for other years are driven by household specific interest returns. The 
assumptions justifying the perfect foresight Euler equation are intertemporal optimization 
and certainty. The third case we offer we call the stochastic model where  t , i m  is perturbed 
around  i m  by realizations of household specific real time t variables. The stochastic 
model specifies 
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where d, q w, q r, q y and q a are 5 additional parameters requiring estimation and tilde 
~ 
denotes the real wage, wi,t/pt, real interest factor, ri,t/pt, or real exogenous income, yi,t/pt. 







5 / w w  is household i’s 5 year real average wage. We interpret this 
as an estimate of a household’s “permanent wage” reflecting all relevant fixed effects, for 
example the education and qualifications of the household head. Household real interest 
return, exogenous income and assets are defined and interpreted similarly. This stochastic 
specification allows for time discounting of real marginal utility. The exponent 
incorporates shift parameters q when real wages, real interest factors, exogenous income 
or assets are perturbed in time t from a household’s 5 year average.  
 
RESULTS 
This section reports on some of the challenges of estimation, how these were 
overcome and results obtained. As is common in non-linear estimation, functions of 
parameters were often easier to identify that the parameters individually. We found that 
the remaining  a ij and  g ij parameters were far easier to estimate once one non-zero a 
and one non-zero  g were specified as constants. This is understandable if one considers 
the structural equations. Consider the (negative) wealth expenditure equation (9) 
reproduced below, 
m + + m = p = - / ) P ( rC ) z ; P ( rB ) P ( rA r * rW r r r r  
                                                                                                                                                 
16 The fit of the regressions are unaffected by which year is chosen.   32
and the explicit function for m, 
* A 2 / ) * C * A 4 * B * B (
2 - - - = m  . 
It can be seen on substitution that the wealth equation changes with the term 
* C * A 4 * B * B
2 - - -  in the proportion rAr/2A* which is simply a ratio of  a 
parameters. The same is also true of the  g parameters where the wealth equation changes 
with the term  * C * A 4 * B * B
2 - + -  in the proportion rCr/2C*. Except for the 
appearance of the a and  g parameters in the discriminant, the structural equations would 
be homogeneous of degree zero in these parameters. As it was not possible to estimate all 
a  and  g parameters simultaneously, we arbitrarily set a 33 =1, an innocuous specification 
because multiplying the a ij parameters and dividing the  g ij parameters by any positive 
constant leaves the structural equations unchanged.  
With the parameter a 33 set to one, attempts were made to estimate the other 
parameters however this was sometimes not successful. In some of the most restricted 
regressions, the  g parameters could be estimated however for some of the richer 
specifications, it was found that the set of  g parameter would uniformly converge to 
zero. This convergence increased the number of iterations and squeeze steps required 
before the TSP program would converge to a solution and was often unsuccessful 
because it would exceeded specified iteration or squeeze step limits.  
Consider now the functional forms of m and l as the parameters  g ij converge to 
zero. In this case, m converges to min[B*,0]/A* and l converges to max[B*,0]/C* as the   33
discriminant converges to B*
2. This creates linear segments to the structural equations in 
m and l, pivoting around the b parameters. Because it is arguably more appealing that 
the structural equations should be “smooth” in  m and l, because the likelihood changed 
little as the  g parameters converged to zero and, in particular, because of the difficulties 
of obtaining successful convergence as the  g ij’s approached zero,  g 11 was sometimes set 
as a constant.  
Other specifications that aided estimation were holding parameters  g 11, g 22 and 
g 33 to be non-negative. It can be seen from the structural equations that these parameters 
are squared. Consequently, it is innocuous for the fit of the regression to use the positive 
values of these diagonal  g ii parameters or truncate it at zero if the likelihood function is 
decreasing in this parameter.
17 Without this specification, the parameter  g ii often seemed 
to oscillate explosively around zero for cases where likelihood was maximized at  g ii=0. 
This truncation was also applied to the a ij parameters to ensure non-negativity. Despite 
these aids to estimation, we found that in no case were we able to estimate parameters 
a ijj so these were arbitrarily left at one. Thus, in the results we report below, some of the 
parameters are unrestricted while others are bound by our convexity restrictions or held 
as constants. Furthermore, the set of parameters that were binding differed depended on 
the regression performed. Nonetheless, the parameter estimates we report here are 
                                                 
17 This was specified in TSP as  ii ii ii ) 0 ( j > j = g  where  ii j  was the parameter actually submitted into 
the regression. Within the parenthesis is a logical function that takes the value 1 if true and 0 if false.   34
convergent and robust in the sense of being independent of the many starting values we 
tried. We describe these regressions next. 
For each of the three models: fixed effect, perfect foresight, and stochastic 
models; we performed four regressions: the basic, demographic, time-separable and  
general regressions. The log likelihoods of these 12 regressions and the number of free 
and constrained parameters are summarized by the 4x3 cells of table 2.  
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In each of the 12 cells of table 2, the top row gives the log likelihood of the 
corresponding model and regression. The second row of each cell gives two numbers: the 
total number of parameters estimated within the parenthesis and the number of free 
parameters estimated outside the parenthesis. The difference between the numbers inside 
and outside the parenthesis is the number of  a ij and  g ij parameters constrained at zero 
due to convexity restrictions or held as a constant. The perfect foresight model involves 
one additional parameter over the fixed effect model, the time discount parameter d. The 
stochastic model involves 5 additional parameters over the fixed effects model, the 
parameters d, q w, q r, q y, and q a. While the perfect foresight model is not nested in the 
fixed effect model, the likelihood result suggests that it is a somewhat better fit than the 
fixed effects model. The estimate for the time discount factor parameter ranged from 0.61 
to 0.91 in the four regressions with a value of 0.84 for the general regression.   35
The fixed effect model is nested in the stochastic model with  q w, q r, q y, and q a 
all set to zero and d set to one. It is clear on the basis of the likelihood ratio test that the 
hypothesis that these parameters are equal to zero is easily rejected in every regression. 
For this reason, and because the stochastic model allows for the determination of long-
term and intertemporal effects we discuss later, we focus remaining discussion on the 
demographic, time separable and general regression of the stochastic model. 
Table 3 reports parameter estimates for the demographic, time separable and 
general regressions for the stochastic model. Blank cells represent parameters not part of 
the model while cells with a value marked by an asterisk denote a parameter held at a 
constant, either because of a convexity restriction or to aid estimation as described above. 
The only case of the latter is in the stochastic model is parameter  11 g  which was held in 
the general regression at the same value it was in the time-separable regression. We 
found that the likelihood was flat in this parameter but  11 g  tended to drift towards zero, 
together with other  g parameters without a convergent solution. 
Recall that we shall call the direct impact of sub-functions A, B and C, the “A-
effect,” the “B-effect” and the “C-effect” respectively. As discussed above, this captures 
the preferences of the infinitely rich, those in the middle and the infinitely poor. 
One can see from parameter  11 a  in the demographic regressions that the marginal 
propensity to spend additional wealth on consumption is 1.8% for the infinitely rich. The 
marginal propensity to reduce labor earnings captured by parameter  22 a  in the 
demographic regression is 0.4%. In the time separable regression, these effects are   36
captured as a cross price effect by parameter  12 a  and are economically small but 
statistically significant. In contrast, in the general regression, all estimated a parameters 
were bound by our convexity constraint suggesting that the propensity to consume or 
reduce labor earnings is zero for the infinitely rich.  
The above A effect can be understood in the light of changes to the b parameters 
across the regressions. The parameters capturing the intercepts and pivot points of 
consumption, labor and wealth are, respectively,  130 120 110 and , , b b b  for male headed 
households. The corresponding parameters for female headed households are 
230 220 210 and , , b b b , respectively. In both the demographic and time-separable 
regressions, the B effect centers consumption at around $26,000-$31,000 for males and 
$29,000-$35,000 for females. In the general regression, the consumption pivot point 
shifts substantially, to $87,000 for males and $70,000 for females. 
The change in the pivot points across regressions also occurs for labor and 
wealth. The demographic and time-separable regressions find an intercept of 1,730-1,820 
and 1,180-1,320 hours per annum for male and female labor supply respectively while in 
the general regression the corresponding figures are -20 and 90 hours per annum 
respectively. It seems that there is also a change in the pivot points for wealth across the 
regressions however this is measured with considerably less precision that consumption 
or labor. The standard errors on the wealth intercepts are around an order of magnitude 
greater than the standard errors on consumption which are both measured in dollars. 
Nonetheless, it seems wealth pivots around -$11,500 for males and $51,000-$58,000 for   37
females in the demographic and time-separable regression which shifts substantially to 
$580,000 and $490,000 for males and females respectively in the general regression.  
The demographic b parameters which conditions on age, age squared, age cubed 
and number of dependents estimated in all regressions except the basic regression show 
consistency across the regressions. Recall, the age variable we use is reported age of head 
minus 45 years in order to center the regression around prime aged heads. A comparison 
of parameters  120 b  and  220 b  show that- conditional on marginal utility, wages and interest 
rates- males at 45 work longer hours than females of the same age. However, parameters 
121 b  and  221 b  show that males work 35 hours less per annum in the following year 
compared to females who work 18 hours per annum less the following year. The 
parameters  122 b  and  222 b  show that the decline in work hours past 45 years of ages is 
occurring at an increasing rate for both males and females. A comparison of parameters 
130 b  and  230 b  show that females at 45 desire more wealth than males of the same age. 
Parameters  131 b  and  231 b  show that males desire an increase of $3,100-$4,400 in wealth 
in the following year after age 45 compared to females who desire an increase of $2,100-
$2,800. The parameters  132 b  and  232 b  show that the desire to increase wealth is 
increasing past 45 years of ages for both males and females. 
Among the parameters that capture effect of dependents on labor and wealth for 
males and females, only one,  224 b , is consistently statistically significant. This estimate 
suggests females work around 45 hours more per annum for each dependent she has.   38
Although not statistically significant, the estimates are suggestive that males and females 
differ in their savings in response to the number of dependents. Each dependent reduces 
the wealth of males by around $15,000-$22,000 while it seems females save or provide 
an additional $0-$6,200 for each dependent. These results must be tempered in the light 
of the standard errors associated with the estimate. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The evaluation of the C effect is comparatively more difficult than it is for the A 
and B effects. The reason for this is that the  g parameters multiply prices. The structural 
equations of the basic regression (13) illustrate this. For illustrative purposes, let p = 1, w 
= 4.1 and r = 0.93. For the demographic regression using parameters  33 22 11 , , g g g , a one 
unit increase in l decreases consumption by $13,000 and assets by $25,000 and 
increases work hours by 4,150 hours annually.  
Table 4 gives quantitative indicators of fit for the system of 6 equations for the 
demographic, time separable and general regressions for the stochastic model. The R-
square statistic are for the labor earnings equation  t w t t t ) t ( w h w e + p = equation for t = 
1984 to 1988 and wealth equation  1988 r 1988 1988 1988 ) 1988 ( r W r e + p = . Looking across the 
regressions, relaxing consumption-labor additivity can improve the fit of the labor supply 
equations although the fit of the wealth equation falls. Despite this, it can be seen from 
the likelihoods and from table 3 that the two additional parameters, a 12 and g 12, are   39
significant. By relaxing time separability, we have a comparatively larger increase in the 
likelihood which is mainly attributable to the improved fit of the wealth equation. 
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We show the qualitative fit of our consumption, labor and wealth equations for 
the general regression in figures 1.a, 1.b and 1.c respectively. In these figures, we plot 
actual values on predicted values. If our model predicted perfectly, all points would lie on 
a 45 degree line. We see here that the model fits fairly well without obvious systematic 
errors. There appears to be some heteroskedasticity for our consumption equation 
although this doesn’t appear as strong in our labor earnings or wealth equation. Note 
however that the consumption equation was not part of our system of estimating 
equations. One can also see the truncation of actual wealth we used. Our wealth equation 
gave negative predictions for a small portion of our sample. 
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Our final analysis of this model looks at the impact of restrictions that are 
commonly employed in the literature and their impact on various estimated elasticities. 
For the structural equation using say end of period assets as an example,   40
) f , r , w , p ( * A r m p = - , we define Frisch elasticity as the derivative of the log of asset with 
respect to the log of any of the arguments and denote this 
F
Aj e , j={p,w,r,m}. The first item 
in the subscript denotes the choice variable and is c for consumption and h for labor 
hours. We define short term Marshallian elasticities by recognizing the cross-sectional 
dependence of  i m  on prices and beginning wealth. Again using end of period assets as an 
example,  )) W , r , w , p ( f , r , w , p ( * A r m p = - , we define short term Marshallian elasticity of 
end of period asset with respect to j, 
m






Aj  where  Aj e  denotes the elasticity 
with respect to j={p,w,r,W} and superscript M and  F denote Marshallian and Frisch  
elasticities respectively and superscript m denotes the elasticity of  m with respect to any 
of its arguments. It should be understood that the Frisch elasticity with respect to 
beginning wealth is zero since Frisch elasticities condition on  m, not wealth.  
We report Frisch and Marshallian elasticities for rich which we define as those 
with beginning wealth and exogenous income, W = 100,000 and poor households which 
we define as those with W = 50,000. Other prices, held at sample means, are p = 1, w = 
4.1 and r = 0.93 and we assume the individual is 45 years of age with no dependents. 
Table 5 reports predicted consumption, labor and wealth of our rich and poor 
householders which should be read in conjunction with table 1 which reports mean values 
of the sample for interpretation.
18  
                                                 
18 The consumption figure in table 1 is actual 5 year composite consumption (see equation (16)) whereas 
the consumption figure here is predicted one year consumption. Otherwise, actual figures of table 1 and the 
predicted figures of table 5 are comparable. Additionally, we are not attempting to predict the means of   41
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Table 5 can be evaluated in many respects. In comparing between rich and poor 
households we see that the main impact of greater wealth is the perpetuation of high 
wealth holdings. Rich households consume more than poor households although the 
increment is proportionately less than it is for wealth. Note also that rich work less than 
poor by about 80-100 hours annually. Additionally, although we saw that there were 
substantial changes in the A, B and C effects discussed above between the restricted 
regressions and the most general regression, these changes do not manifest themselves to 
a great extent in predicted quantities. End of period asset, consumption and work hours 
are comparable across the regressions. 
In tables 6 and 7, we compare the Frisch and Marshallian elasticities respectively 
for rich and poor households. We see across the regressions of table 6 the effect of 
excluding certain cross-prices in the estimation of elasticities and how, in the general 
model, the full set of elasticities can be estimated. Because of the interconnection 
between Frisch and Marshallian elasticities given above, greater generality affect all 
estimates. 
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table 1 but rather to give readers a sense of where our hypothetical rich and poor household is situated with 
respect to the actual data.   42
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We draw attention to a few elasticities to illustrate the model and the effect of the 
restrictions. Consider the Frisch elasticity of consumption with respect to interest factor. 
Note that because rt = pt+1/(1+it), a one percentage point increase in it will result in an 
approximate one percent decrease in rt. With time separability, the interest factor does 
not exert an independent effect conditional on  m as seen in the Frisch elasticities of table 
6. When this channel is allowed for in our general regression, we see a statistically 
significant and considerable effect which becomes stronger for poorer households. Going 
now to the same cells of table 7 which report Marshallian elasticities, we see with the 
time separable regression that a one percentage point increase in interest rates lead to a 
0.046% and 0.152% decrease in consumption for rich and poor households respectively. 
On the other hand, when this effect is estimated with the general regression, one finds a 
substantial change with a one percentage point increase in interest rates leading to a 
0.255% and 0.581% decrease in consumption for rich and poor households respectively. 
Other patterns that are noteworthy are that the positively sloped labor supply curve 
becomes appreciably more inelastic when estimated with the general regression and that 
the effect of increased wealth on labor supply differentially affects rich and poor 
households. 
Our stochastic model has one other feature which is noteworthy: the ability to 
distinguish between household variation in  i m  arising from cross sectional variation and   43
within household across time variation in  t , i m  arising from innovations in wages, interest 
rates or wealth. From above,  i m  depends on prices, wages, interest factors, exogenous 
income and starting wealth and its variation among households is a function of cross-
sectional household variation of wages, interest factors, exogenous income and starting 
wealth. Consequently, an increase of the wage in say 1985 is combined with wages in 
other years, interest factors, exogenous income and so forth before it results in an 
increase in  i m .  
However, we can also compute a corresponding elasticity of  t , i m  with respect to 
wages, interest factors or assets allowing for the impact of function f. Given, 
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elasticity of  t , i m with respect to its argument adds a component  j
f
fj jq = e  where index j= 
w, r, y and A and here denotes real wage, real interest factor, real exogenous income and 
asset respectively. The homogeneity of function f implies that the sum of elasticities with 
respect to p, w, r, y and W add to zero which allows for the recovery of the elasticity with 
respect to p. Table 8 reports the elasticity of  i m  with respect to wages, interest factors and 
wealth for rich and poor in the first and second panel. In the third panel, the elasticity of 
function f with respect to real wages, real interest factors, real exogenous income and 
assets is reported.  
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A remarkable parallel exists between the elasticity of  i m  for rich households and 
the elasticity f with respect to increases in assets. The elasticity of  i m  with respect to 
wealth for rich households is 0.915 in the demographic regression while the 
corresponding elasticity with respect to f is 0.401. In the general regression however, 
both elasticities seem to decline towards a similar magnitude, 0.178 and 0.179 
respectively. This result is remarkable because these elasticities are derived from 
different functional forms and different aspects of the data. The cross sectional variation 
of wealth for the sample gives us our estimate of this elasticity which is determined 
collectively by g b a and ,  parameters. On the other hand, growth in the level of individual 
wealth over a five year span give us our estimate of time series elasticity which is solely a 
function of the parameter  a q . The consistency between these two estimates suggests this 
elasticity is estimated with some accuracy.  
The elasticity of function f with respect to the interest factor across the 
regressions is rather interesting. Recall, the purpose of function f is to capture the 
evolution of marginal utility across time. Intertemporal optimization suggests the Euler 
equation,  t t t 1 t t p / r ) ( E l = l d + , where households equate the discounted expected future 
marginal utility of wealth saved with present marginal utility of wealth. Taking logs of 
this expression, it can be seen that the elasticity of  t m  with respect to rt should be close to   45
one.
19 The elasticity of function f with respect to the interest factor is estimated at 0.206 
and 0.232 in the demographic and time separable regressions respectively. On the other 
hand, in the general regression, this elasticity is estimated at 1.084 and is not statistically 
different from one. Additionally, the general regression estimates this elasticity with 
greater precision than the demographic and time separable regression judged by the 
standard errors associated with this estimate across the regressions. Because the general 
regression allow for the interest factor to enter into the structural equations explaining 
consumption and labor supply, it appears that removing this mechanism in the restrictive 
regressions biases the estimate of how  t m  varies with interest factor and, incorrectly, 
suggests households are poor intertemporal optimizers.  
The consistency of cross-sectional and time series elasticity estimates with 
respect to wealth contrasts notably with that of wages. The elasticity of  m with respect to 
wages is 0.072 and 0.112 for rich and poor household respectively in the demographic 
regression. On the other hand, the elasticity of f with respect to wages is 0.880 in the 
same regression. In the general regression, the elasticity of  m with respect to wages is 
0.026 for rich and poor households while the elasticity of f with respect to wages is 
0.168, a figure 6.5 times greater.  
We account for this by the different construction of these elasticity estimates. 
Consider the case where a household has constant real interest factor rt/pt = 1, has a fixed 
                                                 
19 An expectation of Y given X, E(Y|X), is a function of X, not a function of Y. Thus, time t marginal 
utility will be a function of the time t interest factor, price, the discount factor and anything else that is part 
of the information set of the household at time t. If rt is not part of the information set of the household, 
then the elasticity will be exactly equal to one.    46
wage and works a fixed number of hours per annum over 5 years. In this simple case, an 
increase in wages in say 1984 has exactly the same impact as a similar increase in say 
1989. Even in the more general case, the elasticity of  m with respect to wages combines 
many other variables into a single scalar measure. Although higher wages are likely to 
persist, no account of this is taken with our cross sectional measure of elasticity. 
On the other hand, this restriction is not imposed in our time series estimate of 
elasticity. The impact of a positive wage shock on the price of marginal utility is likely to 
have a larger impact because this wage might be thought of a likely to persist for some 
time. One can imagine, for example, an individual with low wages for the first 4 years of 
our sample with an unexpected increase in wages in the final year of our sample. This 
individual may capitalize the value of higher future wages and adjust consumption, work 
hours and wealth targets by a larger amount than a similarly situated individual whose 
higher wages will fall to the lower level in subsequent years.  
If such an interpretation is correct, we can now compute long term Marshallian 
elasticities. We define long term Marshallian elasticities as that which not only recognize 
the dependence of individual specific prices and beginning wealth on  i m , but also allows 
for the time t perturbation captured by function f. Using end of period assets as the 
example once more,  )) W , r , w , p ( ) W , y , r , w , p ( f , r , w , p ( * A r m p = - , this elasticity is 










m m e + e e + e = e , where the superscript LM is used. The new term 
with the superscript f denotes the elasticity of function f with respect to j={p,w,r,y}. The 
elasticity of function f is calculated with respect to y rather than W because y is a flow   47
variable that is likely to persist into the future will W is an initial stock. Such defined 
long term Marshallian elasticities are reported in table 9. 
The most notable feature of these estimates when compared to those of table 7 
giving short term Marshallian elasticities is the effect of wages. For example, the short 
term elasticity of a rich household to a one percentage increase in wages on consumption, 
labor supply and wealth is 0.103%, 0.023% and 0.057% respectively but when this 
elasticity is evaluated over the long term, the corresponding change is 0.461%, -0.146% 
and 1.101%. The labor supply curve to long term wages is now backward bending. 
Looking across regressions, the slopes of the more restrictive functional forms understate 
the extent of the backward bend in labor. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our paper sought to examine if duality techniques and greater generality can be 
profitably employed in the modeling of dynamic household choice. Our model treats 
intertemporal choice as a three good problem with choice variables consumption, labor 
supply and savings subject to a budget constraint- a treatment very similar to techniques 
used by demand modelers. In doing so, the invention of a new functional form was 
required which allows for the inversion of the budget constraint to determine an explicit 
expression for the unobserved marginal utility of income. This is, arguably, the most 
substantive contribution of this paper.   48
In addition to meeting this necessary requirement, our functional form has 
appealing properties. Our functional form is globally regular, rank 3 and is derived from a 
Laurent series approximation rather than the Taylor series approximation often used in 
flexible functional forms. Empirically, it can be seen that the model fits the data well.  
With this new model, we tested two commonly maintained hypotheses and 
decisively rejected both consumption-labor additivity and time separability. These 
restrictions on the primal maximization problem amount- in the dual- to an imposition of 
zero cross-price Frisch elasticities which we find are restrictions that should be rejected. 
Removing these cross-price restrictions changes the entire set of estimated Frisch and 
Marshallian elasticities. Additionally, important intertemporal parameters such as the rate 
of time preference and the time series elasticity of the marginal utility of income with 
respect to changes in wage, interest factor and wealth are more precisely measured by our 
more general regression. 
Our results cast doubt on contemporary elasticity estimates made using the more 
restrictive forms. For example, we find that the estimated decline of consumption with 
respect to interest rates increases is greatly understated (by a factor of around 5) by 
restrictive regressions. We find that a one percent increase in interest rates decrease 
consumption of rich and poor households by 0.255 and 0.581 percent respectively instead 
of 0.046% and 0.152%. The common presumption that labor supply is positively sloped 
was found only to apply to transitory wage increases. Should the wage increase be 
permanent or at least persistent, the wealth effect of higher wages causes labor supply to   49
contract. May elasticities are affected by separability assumptions which are all detailed 
in the preceding tables. 
 
However, more than the particulars of our findings, what we hope we offer to the 
profession is a fruitful approach that opens new areas in economics. To this end, we offer 
what we consider worthwhile extensions of our framework. Some of these are merely 
technical refinements but others have the potential to affect other fields of economics. 
On a technical level, we estimated preferences for single headed households using 
what amounts to a single cross-section. Although the data was a panel, it was necessary 
to have beginning and end wealth to determine consumption. We do not have true 
“within” and “between" errors analogous to variance component models. To do this, a 
third wealth supplement is required. This would allow analysis of household behavior 
across time and in cross-section. This was not done in this paper because, at the time of 
writing, final release PSID data for the next wealth supplement in 1994 was unavailable. 
The use of early release data would have allowed for the analysis to include wealth from 
the 1994, 1999 and 2001 waves of the PSID building a true panel structure for the data. 
We did not attempt this however because we relied on numerous constructed variables 
unavailable in the early release files, for example federal taxes. 
Another important development would be extending this to couples. The number 
of married and joint households is 3 times larger that single headed households which 
allows for a better analysis simply from having more data alone. The household 
intertemporal problem can be conceived of as a four good problem: how much to   50
consume, how much to save, and the labor supply of the head and the spouse as separate 
choices. It would be interesting to allow for the interaction between head and spouse 
labor supply.  
Another extension is to model the demand for particular classes of assets. We 
aggregated all forms of wealth and derived a composite return of this wealth. However, 
given that that the PSID has the individual return of many assets, it would seem possible 
to treat these as distinct goods, each with its own price. This would then allow the 
analysis of substitutability or complementarity of the different assets. Another extension 
or refinement would be to further generalize the functional form. For example, the 
literature on precautionary savings suggests that income volatility increases the demand 
for wealth. This analysis can be captured in our framework by incorporating income 
volatility measures in our sub-function C since it is the poor that are most likely to be 
intertemporally constrained.  
In general, what was surprising to us was that every generalization we attempted- 
going from the basic, to the demographic, time separable and general regressions, and 
incorporation of q parameters one at a time in function f- proved to be statistically 
significant. This suggests that the search for even greater generality and improved fit has 
not been exhausted. While this is true, it is also true that estimation at times proved to be 
a substantial challenge. Yet another refinement would be to improve the efficiency of our 
estimation procedure.  
Because of the central importance of household choice in much of economics, our 
results have wide-ranging implications for other fields in economics and for public   51
policy. Our results should be incorporated into business cycle theories where modeling 
the dynamic behavior of households is of central importance. Another application is in 
the field of social welfare functions. Our model identifies the marginal utility of income 
which occupies a central place in analyses that consider the redistribution of income. A 
further application is in the area of tax incidence. A fundamental policy choice is the 
balance of taxes on consumption (sales and value added taxes), labor earnings (social 
security, payroll and income taxes) and wealth (corporate income, property and wealth 
taxes) and our model informs on each of these elasticities. Another application is in 
general equilibrium models where the flows to and from firms are matched with the flows 
from and to households. The supply of consumption by firms to household and the supply 
of labor by households to firms are obvious, but it would also seem possible that the 
wealth demand of households could be translated into the capital requirement of firms.  
We offer our procedure in the hope economists find this fertile ground.   52
REFERENCES 
 
Altonji, J. G. (1986), “Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply: Evidence from Micro 
Data”, Journal of Political Economy 94 (part II): S176-S215. 
 
Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Lewbell, A. (1997) “Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer 
Demand”, Review of Economics and Statistics 74: 527-539. 
 
Barnett, W. A. (1983) “New Indices of Money Supply and the Flexible Laurent Demand 
System”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 1: 7-23. 
 
Barnett, W. A., Fisher, D. and Serletis, A., (1992) “Consumer Theory and the Demand 
for Money,” Journal of Economic Literature, 30: 2086-2119. 
 
Barnett, W. A. and Hahm, J. H. (1994) “Financial-Firm Production of Monetary Services: 
A Generalized Symmetric Barnett Variable-Profit-Function Approach”, Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 1: 7-23. 
 
Blackorby, C., Primont, D. and Russel, R. R. (1977), “On Testing Separability 
Restrictions with Flexible Functional Forms,” Journal of Econometrics 5: 195-209. 
   53
Browning, M., Deaton, A. and Irish, M. (1985), “A Profitable Approach to Labor Supply 
and Commodity Demand over the Life Cycle,” Econometrica 53: 503-543. 
 
Chaudhuri, A. (1995), “One the Relationship between the Frisch and Slutsky 
Decompositions,” Economic Letters, 47, 283-290. 
 
Chaudhuri, A. (1996), “Comparative Statistics for Dynamic Models: Empirical 
Implications of the Frisch Decomposition,” International Economic Review, 37:1, 103-
114. 
 
Cooper, R. J., McLaren, K. R. and Wong, G. K. K. (2001), “On the Empirical 
Exploitation of Consumer’s Profit Functions in Static Analyses,” Economic Letters, 
77:181-187. 
 
Diewert, W. E. (1974), “Applications of Duality Theory,” in Frontiers of Quantitative 
Economics, Volume II, ed. Intrilligator and Kendrick, North Holland Publishing 
Company. 
 
Hill, M. S. (1992) The Panel Study of Income Dynamics: A User’s Guide. Sage 
Publications.  
   54
Kim, H. Y., (1993), “Frisch Demand Functions and Intertemporal Substitution in 
Consumption,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25:3 445-454. 
 
Lewbel, A. (1991) “The Rank of Demand Systems: Theory and Nonparametric 
Estimation”, Econometrica, 59: 711-730. 
 
MaCurdy, T. E. (1981), “An Empirical Model of Labour Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting”, 
Journal of Political Economy 89: 1059-1085. 
 
McLaren, K. R., Rossitter, P. D. and Powell, A. A. (2000) “Using the Cost Function to 
Generate Marshallian Demand Systems”, Empirical Economics 25: 209-227. 
 
McLaughlin, K. J. (1995), “Intertemporal Substitution and l-constant Comparative 
Statics,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 35: 193-213. 
 
Meghir, C. and Weber, G. (1996) “Intertemporal Nonseparability or Borrowing 
Restrictions? A Disaggregate Analysis Using a U.S. Consumption Panel,” Econometrica, 
64:4, 1151-1181. 
 
Merrigan, P. (1994), “Family Labor Supply and the Life Cycle: Estimating the Browning, 
Deaton and Irish Household Model,” Universite du Quebec a Montreal working paper 
No. 26.   55
 
Ryan, D. L. and Wales, T. J. (1999) “Flexible and Semiflexible Consumer Demands and 





Table 1. Summary statistics of selected sample in 1988 by gender. 
  Male headed households (n=92)  Female headed households (n=433) 
Variable  mean  std. dev.  minimum  maximum  mean  std. dev.  minimum  maximum 
Age of Head  56.5  17.6  27  90  63.1  16.2  25  97 
# of dependents  1.3  0.75  1  6  1.3  0.81  0  8 
Consumption ($)  80,178  45,055  10,802  209,461  61,130  39,823  6,397  270,458 
Wealth ($)  73,950  79,257  1,500  439,000  69,587  91,392  1,200  825,000 
Interest return (i)  0.071  0.086  -0.184  0.335  0.076  0.093  -0.199  0.338 
Exogenous income ($y)  1,998  8,643  -21,918  34,320  5,172  15,116  -10,399  255,953 
Head work hours *  1,907  586  120  2,880  1,666  611  10  2,975 
Labor Earnings ($) *  16,144  13,243  441  66,861  10,243  8,120  65  42,947 
* summary statistics reported only for the 61 males and 203 females working in 1989. 
 
 
Table 2. Log likelihood fit of various regressions and models 
  Fixed Effect Model  Perfect Foresight Model  Stochastic Model 


























Table 3. Parameter estimates of the stochastic model across 3 regressions 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Estimate  Std. Error  Estimate  Std. Error 
a 11  0.017944  6.76E-03  0*    0*   
a 12      3.73E-03  8.29E-04  0*   
a 13          0*   
a 22  3.96E-03  6.58E-04  0*    0*   
a 23          0*   
b 110  -25796.7  1427.99  -31458.1  1269.78  -86885.9  5662.81 
b 210  -28630  1327.27  -35339.3  1019.62  -69537.4  4004.72   56
b 120  1822.79  34.9589  1733.43  37.832  -22.9231  155.579 
b 121  -34.0907  2.08425  -35.0078  2.18231  -28.4397  2.66114 
b 122  -1.4697  0.13809  -1.61456  0.140394  -1.68049  0.189105 
b 123  0.022245  5.69E-03  0.025722  5.74E-03  0.027636  6.76E-03 
b 124  -3.72301  13.0213  -0.12819  12.5666  31.1976  13.8727 
b 220  1315.08  34.8169  1176.44  40.9519  91.9538  101.084 
b 221  -18.2354  2.11219  -17.6295  2.03109  -20.5572  2.02819 
b 222  -0.83295  0.123286  -0.79751  0.121067  -0.67956  0.113292 
b 223  0.012568  5.63E-03  8.88E-03  5.37E-03  0.011064  5.15E-03 
b 224  44.4819  14.9879  44.9085  14.7947  45.8399  14.5682 
b 130  11805.6  18653.2  11429.5  19354.9  -582342  49666.9 
b 131  -4395.32  800.485  -3892.46  913.959  -3147.34  845.961 
b 132  -191.183  51.6868  -218.434  56.6515  -352.551  61.8298 
b 133  5.23984  1.52838  5.54467  1.69915  8.3224  1.59095 
b 134  15065.4  20767.1  15083.3  15809.4  22120.5  12679.8 
b 230  -50698  8616.17  -57797.3  11188.7  -489221  32123.8 
b 231  -2148.1  454.897  -2307.77  482.224  -2783.27  731.24 
b 232  -115.81  31.2484  -109.766  32.3231  -57.1472  47.8156 
b 233  2.76845  0.681474  2.66995  0.695061  2.01035  0.935815 
b 234  -6245.56  4445.54  -4916.96  4660.93  526.542  7388.93 
g 11  13080.1  1519.95  19990.9  2391.25  19990.9*   
g 12      353.387  79.0996  -271.067  44.8451 
g 13          33243.6  8363.41 
g 22  1011.93  112.395  1083.37  121.909  529.301  62.8834 
g 23          85504.8  4974.84 
g 33  27019.2  2470.59  38976.8  4126.3  0*   
q w  0.214725  9.28E-03  0.165366  8.82E-03  0.040877  2.81E-03 
q r  0.221297  0.385137  0.249454  0.290191  1.1661  0.081354 
q y  1.04E-05  1.13E-06  1.04E-05  9.81E-07  1.00E-05  8.66E-07 
q a  4.01E-06  1.29E-06  1.92E-06  9.84E-07  1.79E-06  2.42E-07 
d  0.950  0.012  0.954  0.010  0.985  0.003 
0* indicates a binding convexity restriction on the parameter. 
 
 
Table 4. Statistics of fit for labor earnings and wealth equations for  
stochastic model across demographic, time separable and general regressions. 
Statistic of Fit  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
R
2: labor 1984  0.881  0.881  0.885 
R
2: labor 1985  0.891  0.890  0.894   57
R
2: labor 1986  0.918  0.917  0.914 
R
2: labor 1987  0.924  0.926  0.921 
R
2: labor 1988  0.932  0.932  0.926 
R
2: wealth 1989  0.780  0.767  0.787 
Log. Likelihood  -29353.4  -29342.0  -29264.8 
 
 
Table 5. Predicted consumption, labor and wealth for rich and poor households. 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
  Rich Household 
Assets (1989 dollars)  87547.6  925.3  85920.7  1032.6  85489.6  1572.4 
Consumption (1989 dollars)  25837.6  853.4  27383.0  945.5  27669.7  1428.6 
Annual Work Hours  1770.0  25.3  1777.9  26.1  1750.0  40.1 
  Poor Household 
Assets (1989 dollars)  36353.3  968.0  35371.6  1146.6  38100.7  1576.8 
Consumption (1989 dollars)  23750.3  882.6  24812.5  1016.9  22389.5  1430.2 
Annual Work Hours  1843.6  27.3  1880.0  33.4  1908.1  40.9 
 
 
Table 6. Frisch elasticities for rich and poor households. 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
  Rich Household 
F
cp e   -0.136  0.025  -0.142  0.025  -0.858  0.131 
F
cw e       -0.012  0.003  0.048  0.010 
F
cr e           -1.329  0.226 
F
cm e   0.136  0.025  0.154  0.027  2.140  0.236 
F
hp e       0.047  0.010  -0.184  0.040 
F
hw e   0.078  0.011  0.063  0.008  0.049  0.008 
F
hr e           1.148  0.083 
F
hm e   -0.078  0.011  -0.110  0.015  -1.013  0.089 
F
Ap e           -0.463  0.076 
F
Aw e           -0.104  0.007 
F
Ar e   -1.292  0.197  -1.452  0.212  -5.668  0.508 
F
Am e   1.292  0.197  1.452  0.212  6.234  0.577 
  Poor Household   58
F
cp e   -0.171  0.027  -0.252  0.048  -1.156  0.188 
F
cw e       -0.020  0.005  0.064  0.014 
F
cr e           -1.789  0.301 
F
cm e   0.171  0.027  0.272  0.052  2.881  0.327 
F
hp e       0.064  0.013  -0.184  0.040 
F
hw e   0.070  0.008  0.064  0.007  0.049  0.008 
F
hr e           1.147  0.076 
F
hm e   -0.070  0.008  -0.128  0.017  -1.012  0.082 
F
Ap e           -1.131  0.183 
F
Aw e           -0.253  0.017 
F
Ar e   -1.991  0.399  -2.571  0.446  -13.770  1.241 
F
Am e   1.991  0.399  2.571  0.446  15.154  1.405 
 
 
Table 7. Marshallian elasticities for rich and poor households. 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
  Rich Household 
M
cp e   -0.163  0.027  -0.171  0.028  -0.738  0.124 
M
cw e   0.010  0.002  -0.002  0.003  0.103  0.011 
M
cr e   0.030  0.018  0.046  0.018  0.255  0.108 
M
cW e   0.124  0.022  0.128  0.026  0.381  0.024 
M
hp e   0.016  0.002  0.068  0.011  -0.241  0.039 
M
hw e   0.072  0.011  0.056  0.008  0.023  0.007 
M
hr e   -0.017  0.010  -0.033  0.013  0.398  0.036 
M
hW e   -0.071  0.009  -0.091  0.013  -0.180  0.008 
M
Ap e   -0.264  0.015  -0.278  0.017  -0.113  0.044 
M
Aw e   0.092  0.002  0.097  0.002  0.057  0.004 
M
Ar e   -1.011  0.007  -1.019  0.007  -1.053  0.035 
M
AW e   1.182  0.014  1.199  0.016  1.109  0.021 
  Poor Household 
M
cp e   -0.218  0.035  -0.305  0.055  -0.956  0.174   59
M
cw e   0.019  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.139  0.016 
M
cr e   0.080  0.017  0.152  0.028  0.581  0.155 
M
cW e   0.119  0.031  0.147  0.037  0.236  0.019 
M
hp e   0.019  0.003  0.089  0.014  -0.254  0.039 
M
hw e   0.062  0.007  0.052  0.006  0.023  0.007 
M
hr e   -0.033  0.009  -0.072  0.014  0.314  0.035 
M
hW e   -0.049  0.008  -0.069  0.011  -0.083  0.003 
M
Ap e   -0.545  0.050  -0.503  0.071  -0.084  0.108 
M
Aw e   0.224  0.007  0.242  0.009  0.138  0.011 
M
Ar e   -1.063  0.015  -1.131  0.024  -1.298  0.087 
M
AW e   1.385  0.049  1.393  0.063  1.243  0.052 
 
 
Table 8. Cross sectional m and function f elasticities. 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
  Rich Household 
m
m e w   -0.204  0.035  -0.191  0.030  0.056  0.006 
m
m e r   0.072  0.011  0.067  0.009  0.026  0.001 
m
m e A   0.218  0.114  0.298  0.098  0.740  0.014 
  Poor Household 
m
m e w   -0.204  0.035  -0.191  0.030  0.056  0.006 
m
m e r   0.072  0.011  0.067  0.009  0.026  0.001 
m
m e A   0.218  0.114  0.298  0.098  0.740  0.014 
  Elasticity of function f. 
f
fw e   0.880  0.038  0.678  0.036  0.168  0.012 
f
fr e   0.206  0.358  0.232  0.270  1.084  0.076 
f
fy e   1.041  0.113  1.036  0.098  1.002  0.087 
f
fA e   0.401  0.129  0.192  0.098  0.179  0.024 
 
 
Table 9. Long term Marshallian Elasticities. 
  Demographic  Time Separable  General 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.   60
  Rich Household 
LM
cp e   -0.452  0.094  -0.472  0.079  -5.562  0.545 
LM
cw e   0.129  0.023  0.102  0.016  0.461  0.037 
LM
cr e   0.057  0.055  0.082  0.046  2.576  0.317 
LM
cW e   0.265  0.043  0.287  0.048  2.524  0.230 
LM
hp e   0.182  0.036  0.282  0.045  2.042  0.135 
LM
hw e   0.004  0.004  -0.019  0.005  -0.146  0.007 
LM
hr e   -0.033  0.031  -0.058  0.034  -0.701  0.102 
LM
hW e   -0.152  0.017  -0.205  0.024  -1.195  0.059 
LM
Ap e   -3.012  0.638  -3.103  0.527  -14.163  0.991 
LM
Aw e   1.230  0.172  1.081  0.130  1.101  0.066 
LM
Ar e   -0.745  0.466  -0.682  0.396  5.708  0.658 
LM
AW e   2.527  0.236  2.704  0.206  7.353  0.420 
  Poor Household 
LM
cp e   -0.492  0.088  -0.693  0.138  -6.006  0.653 
LM
cw e   0.170  0.026  0.190  0.037  0.622  0.055 
LM
cr e   0.115  0.062  0.215  0.080  3.705  0.460 
LM
cW e   0.208  0.043  0.288  0.063  1.679  0.172 
LM
hp e   0.132  0.026  0.271  0.048  1.520  0.110 
LM
hw e   0.001  0.003  -0.034  0.008  -0.146  0.006 
LM
hr e   -0.047  0.027  -0.101  0.039  -0.784  0.098 
LM
hW e   -0.085  0.011  -0.135  0.018  -0.590  0.028 
LM
Ap e   -3.745  0.984  -4.174  0.918  -26.647  2.129 
LM
Aw e   1.977  0.345  1.985  0.274  2.678  0.188 
LM
Ar e   -0.653  0.720  -0.535  0.704  15.136  1.618 
LM
AW e   2.421  0.253  2.725  0.252  8.833  0.581 
   61
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